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A Triple Play for the Public Domain: 
Delaware Lottery to Motorola to C.B.C.* 
Matthew J. Mitten
**
 
A trilogy of cases decided by federal courts over the past thirty years 
correctly holds that game scores, real-time game accounts, and player sta-
tistics are in the public domain.  There is a consistent thread in these federal 
cases, based on sound legal, public policy and economic analysis, which 
justifies judicial rejection of state law claims by sports leagues and players 
asserting exclusive rights to this purely factual information.  The creation 
of a collateral product incorporating merely public domain information 
about a sports event or athletes‘ performances, including fantasy league 
games, is not (and should not be) infringing—absent copyright or patent 
infringement in violation of federal law, or a likelihood of consumer confu-
sion regarding its origin, endorsement, or sponsorship in violation of the 
Lanham Act.1  These courts implicitly recognize the need for a uniform na-
tional standard to determine the nature and scope of one‘s rights to use this 
nationally distributed and available public information for commercial pur-
poses without authorization. 
In 1977, in National Football League v. Governor of Delaware (―De-
laware Lottery‖),2 a federal district court held that game scores are not sub-
 
* The consistency of these three cases evokes memories of the Baseball Hall of Fame trio of Joe 
Tinker, Johnny Evers, and Frank Chance, who led the Chicago Cubs to their last World Series cham-
pionship in 1908.  The Official Site of the Chicago Cubs, History: Cubs Timeline, http://chicago. 
cubs.mlb.com/chc/history/timeline02.jsp (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).  This double-play combination 
inspired the 1910 poem, Baseball’s Sad Lexicon, written by Franklin Pierce Adams, a New York Even-
ing Mail sports writer, with its famous refrain: 
These are the saddest of possible words: 
―Tinker to Evers to Chance.‖ 
Trio of bear cubs and fleeter than birds, 
Tinker and Evers and Chance. 
Ruthlessly pricking our gonfalon bubble, 
Making a Giant hit into a double— 
Words that are heavy with nothing but trouble: 
―Tinker to Evers to Chance.‖ 
Baseball Almanac, Baseball‘s Sad Lexicon by Franklin Pierce Adams, http://www.baseball-almanac. 
com/poetry/po_sad.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
** Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute, Marquette University Law 
School. 
 1 The Lanham Act provides a federal statutory right to prevent trademark infringement and un-
fair competition.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2000). 
 2 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977). 
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ject to exclusive commercial use by the professional sports league that pro-
duced the games and voluntarily disseminated this information.  Without 
the National Football League‘s (―NFL‖) authorization, the Delaware State 
Lottery conducted a ―Scoreboard‖ lottery in which players made bets rang-
ing from one to ten dollars based on the results of weekly NFL games.  
Scoreboard tickets listed the teams by their respective city names (for ex-
ample, Green Bay) rather than their nicknames (for example, Packers).  
Players won cash prizes for correctly selecting the winning teams.3 
Rejecting its state law misappropriation claim, the court held that the 
NFL has no legal right to prevent third parties from producing collateral 
products, the demand for which is created by the public popularity of the 
underlying games and athletic performances.  Although the NFL‘s ―popu-
larity and reputation played a major role in defendants‘ choice of NFL 
games as the subject matter of its lottery[,]‖ the court refused to broadly de-
fine the NFL‘s ―product‖ or exclusive property rights as encompassing ―the 
total ‗end result‘ of their labors, including the public interest which has 
been generated.‖4 
Even though defendants profited from the popularity of NFL football, 
the court found no misappropriation of the NFL‘s property rights, explain-
ing: 
It is true that Delaware is thus making profits it would not make but for the exis-
tence of the NFL, but I find this difficult to distinguish from the multitude of 
charter bus companies who generate profit from servicing those of plaintiffs‘ 
fans who want to go to the stadium or, indeed, the sidewalk popcorn salesman 
who services the crowd as it surges towards the gate. 
While courts have recognized that one has a right to one‘s own harvest, this 
proposition has not been construed to preclude others from profiting from de-
mands for collateral services generated by the success of one‘s business venture.5 
Because the schedule of NFL games and scores was obtained by de-
fendants from public sources, this purely factual information could be used 
by defendants (and others) to create a collateral product, but not in a man-
ner that otherwise infringed on the NFL‘s rights.  The ―Scoreboard‖ lottery 
did not violate federal6 or state7 anti-gambling laws, and defendants did not 
infringe on the NFL‘s trademarks simply by informing the public that its 
lottery offered the opportunity to play a betting game based on the results 
of NFL games.8  However, defendants‘ conduct violated the Lanham Act 
by creating the false impression that their lottery was approved or spon-
 
 3 Id. at 1376. 
 4 Id. at 1377. 
 5 Id. at 1378.  The court also observed: ―The NFL undoubtedly would not be in the position it is 
today if college football and the fan interest that it generated had not preceded the NFL‘s organization.‖  
Id. 
 6 Id. at 1388–89. 
 7 Id. at 1382–88. 
 8 Id. at 1380. 
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sored by the NFL.9  To prevent continuing public confusion and resulting 
harm to the NFL from an undesirable association with an unauthorized col-
lateral product, the court required the defendants to include a clear and con-
spicuous statement disclaiming any association with, or approval by, the 
NFL on all future publicly distributed materials regarding the ―Scoreboard‖ 
lottery.10 
Similarly, in 1997, in National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc.,11 
the Second Circuit relied on federal copyright law to preempt state misap-
propriation law from prohibiting the unauthorized commercial use of real-
time accounts of NBA games derived from their public broadcast.  Defen-
dants manufactured and sold a handheld pager, ―SportsTrax,‖ that dis-
played periodically updated information (usually every two to three mi-
nutes) regarding NBA games in progress, including the teams playing, 
score changes, team possession, free-throw bonus situation, and the game‘s 
quarter and remaining time.  The NBA game scores and other information 
displayed on the SportsTrax pager were gathered by paid personnel who 
watched games broadcast on television or listened to games on the radio 
and typed the data into their personal computers.  This information was 
then compiled by a centralized host computer and transmitted via satellite 
and radio networks.12 
The Second Circuit held that defendants‘ unauthorized usage of real-
time game accounts does not constitute copyright infringement.  The under-
lying NBA basketball games (the source of this factual information) were 
not protected by federal copyright law because athletic events and perfor-
mances do not constitute ‗original works of authorship‘ under the 1976 
Copyright Act.13  The court held the defendants did not infringe on the 
NBA‘s copyrighted game broadcasts because ―they reproduced only facts 
from the broadcasts, not the expression or description of the game that con-
stitutes the broadcast.‖14 
Construing 17 U.S.C. section 301 of the Copyright Act, the court held 
that the NBA‘s state law misappropriation claim was preempted because 
―Congress, in extending copyright protection only to the broadcasts and not 
to the underlying events, intended that the latter be in the public domain.‖15  
In other words, factual accounts of games obtained from publicly available 
sources—such as broadcasts—are in the public domain rather than the ex-
clusive property of the game‘s producer.16  Thus, subject to some limita-
 
 9 Id. at 1380–81. 
 10 Id. at 1381. 
 11 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 12 Id. at 843–44. 
 13 Id. at 846–47. 
 14 Id. at 847. 
 15 Id. at 849.  Therefore, the court found it unnecessary to address defendants‘ First Amendment 
defense to this claim.  Id. at 854 n.10. 
 16 The Second Circuit observed that its ruling is consistent with Delaware Lottery.  Id. at 853 n.8.  
See also Morris Commc‘ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (although 
MITTEN 11/10/2008 1:05 PM 
572 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:569 
tions to prevent consumer confusion or unfair competition that would inhi-
bit a sports league‘s economic incentive to produce or license a similar 
competing product, this information may be used commercially to create 
collateral products without the sports league‘s authorization. 
The Second Circuit ruled that defendants did not violate the Lanham 
Act because there was no false advertising of any material facts regarding 
the SportsTrax pager that confused consumers or influenced their purchas-
ing decisions.17  At the time suit was filed, the NBA did not offer its own 
pager similar to SportsTrax, but it planned to offer a competing product in 
the future.  Although it held that a narrow ―hot news‖ misappropriation 
claim is not preempted, the court concluded that all three elements of this 
claim (the time-sensitive value of factual information; free-riding by defen-
dants; and a threat to the very existence of the NBA‘s product) were not es-
tablished.18  The real-time factual information provided by the SportsTrax 
pager is time-sensitive, but defendants paid the costs of its collection, com-
pilation, and transmission, rather than free-riding on the NBA‘s efforts to 
produce a similar product.19  Observing that the NBA‘s primary business is 
―producing basketball games for live attendance and licensing copyrighted 
broadcasts of those games[,]‖20 the court found ―no evidence that anyone 
regards . . . SportsTrax . . . as a substitute for attending NBA games or 
watching them on television.‖21  The court also found that the mere exis-
tence of the SportsTrax pager would not provide an economic disincentive 
for the NBA to produce its own pager.  In fact, the NBA may have a com-
petitive edge that will enable it to produce a more desirable superior prod-
uct because it has a ―temporal advantage in collecting and transmitting 
official statistics.‖22 
In 2007, the Eighth Circuit decided C.B.C. Distribution and Market-
ing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.23  Its holding is 
consistent with Delaware Lottery and Motorola, although neither case is 
mentioned in the court‘s opinion.  The court held that the First Amendment 
trumped Missouri‘s common law right of publicity and permitted the op-
erator of an on-line fantasy baseball league to use Major League Baseball 
players‘ names to identify statistics generated by their respective game per-
 
PGA Tour has a ―property right‖ in real-time tournament golf scores compiled by its own efforts and 
expense, it ―vanishes when the scores are in the public domain.‖), aff’d, 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 919 (2004). 
 17 Nat’l Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 854–55. 
 18 Id. at 853–54. 
 19 However, the court noted if defendants ―in the future were to collect facts from an enhanced 
Gamestats pager [produced by the NBA] to retransmit them to SportsTrax pagers, that would constitute 
free-riding and might well cause Gamestats to be unprofitable because it had to bear costs to collect 
facts that SportsTrax did not.‖  Id. at 854. 
 20 Id. at 853. 
 21 Id. at 853–54. 
 22 Id. at 854 n.9. 
 23 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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formances.24  It observed that ―the information used in C.B.C.‘s fantasy 
baseball games is all readily available in the public domain, and it would be 
strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right to use in-
formation that is available to everyone.‖25  In support of its conclusion, the 
Eighth Circuit relied on its own precedent, holding that the expressive con-
tent of video games is protected speech under the First Amendment,26 as 
well as a California appellate court case holding that incorporating former 
players‘ names, bios, and statistics into Major League Baseball‘s official 
website and several All-Star Game and World Series programs is similarly 
protected.27 
This case arose out of a declaratory judgment action filed by C.B.C. 
against Major League Baseball Advanced Media (―MLBAM‖), the interac-
tive media and Internet arm of Major League Baseball.28  C.B.C. alleged 
that MLBAM maintained ―exclusive ownership of statistics associated with 
players‘ names and that it can, therefore, preclude all fantasy sports league 
providers from using this statistical information to provide fantasy baseball 
games to the consuming public.‖29  In 2005, MLBAM had acquired the 
right to use and license Major League Baseball players‘ publicity rights 
from the Major League Baseball Players Association (―MLBPA‖) for inter-
active media and Internet products.30  From July 1995 through December 
2004, MLBPA licensed C.B.C. to use its players‘ publicity rights as part of 
its fantasy baseball league.31  The parties‘ final agreement contained provi-
sions pursuant to which C.B.C. agreed not to challenge the validity of the 
rights licensed by MLBPA during or after its expiration and to discontinue 
using these rights after its expiration or termination,32 which MLBPA as-
serted as an intervening party in a breach of contract claim against 
C.B.C..33  Without determining whether these no-challenge and no-use 
provisions were unenforceable on First Amendment grounds, the Eighth 
Circuit ruled that they were invalid because MLBPA misrepresented that it 
owned the players‘ publicity rights that were determined to be in the public 
domain.34 
Like the ―Scoreboard‖ lottery and a SportsTrax pager, an on-line fan-
tasy baseball league is a lawful collateral product that incorporates infor-
 
 24 Id. at 823. 
 25 Id.  In light of its holding, the court did not address C.B.C.‘s alternative argument that the 
Copyright Act preempted the state law publicity rights.  Id. at 824. 
 26 Id. at 823 (relying on Interactive Digital Software Ass‘n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 
954, 957 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 27 Id. at 823–24 (citing Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 411 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001)). 
 28 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 
1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 29 Id. at 1081. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 1080. 
 32 C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824. 
 33 Id. at 820. 
 34 Id. at 825. 
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mation (like baseball statistics) readily available in the public domain.35  
Delaware Lottery, Motorola, and C.B.C. recognize that there should be a 
uniform national right to use sports scores, game accounts, and statistics 
that are in the public domain, which should not be limited by individual 
state law rights.36  In all three cases, publicly available information has 
been collected and incorporated into a new product without violating any 
copyright, patent, trademark, or contract rights—or otherwise constituting 
unfair competition that threatens to reduce the production of sports events 
and athletic performances.  Collectively, these cases reflect a consistent 
underlying economic principle that appropriately balances the nature and 
scope of the exclusive rights of sports leagues and athletes with those of the 
public to create collateral sports-related products desired by consumers. 
The law must establish an economic incentive to create intellectual 
property and reward those who produce it, as our federal copyright and pa-
tent statutes do.  However, state misappropriation and publicity rights laws 
should not confer monopoly power on sports leagues and athletes that pre-
vents others from producing collateral products that incorporate informa-
tion in the public domain.  Allowing free access to game scores, real-time 
game accounts, and player statistics will stimulate the development of new 
collateral products desired by consumers, without discouraging the produc-
tion of ―officially licensed or authorized‖ products by sports leagues and 
athletes or their licensees.  For example, consumers now have the option of 
playing C.B.C.‘s on-line fantasy league game or others officially licensed 
by MLBAM that may provide attractive enhancements not available as part 
of unauthorized games. 
Unlike the unauthorized broadcast of an entire athletic performance, 
as occurred in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.37—which the 
Supreme Court ruled may be prohibited under state publicity rights laws 
without violating the First Amendment38—an unauthorized fantasy league 
game does not create an economic disincentive for players to perform to 
the best of their abilities or to develop their respective reputations and 
fame.  Even without the exclusive rights and legal protection conferred by 
state publicity rights laws, athletes have sufficient economic incentives to 
produce high quality, creative athletic performances and market their iden-
tities.39  Athletes would still be able to derive income (likely to be substan-
 
 35 Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DMC), 2007 WL 1797648, at *11 (D.N.J. June 20, 
2007) (fantasy sports leagues do not violate the federal Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 
of 2006 or state qui tam laws). 
 36 For similar reasons, courts have refused to use state antitrust and labor law to regulate national 
professional sports leagues.  Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 679 (Cal. 1983); 
State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Wis. 1966). 
 37 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 38 Id. at 578–79. 
 39 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 
81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 210 (1993) (observing that ―even without the right of publicity the rate of return 
to stardom in the entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth a more than 
‗adequate‘ supply of creative effort and achievement.‖). 
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tial) from the licensed or authorized use of their identities in connection 
with fantasy league games.40 
In C.B.C., the Eighth Circuit correctly concluded that MLBAM did 
not have the legal right to prevent the names of baseball players and their 
playing statistics from being used in connection with unauthorized fantasy 
baseball products.  However, by holding that this conduct violated the 
players‘ publicity rights,41 it failed to recognize that public domain baseball 
statistics in the form of a fantasy league game—not player identities or per-
sonas—is the collateral product offered to the public.  Those playing on-
line fantasy league games pay a fee to the league‘s operator, ―draft‖ actual 
Major League Baseball players prior to the start of the season, and compete 
against others who have drafted their own teams for prizes and/or bragging 
rights.  As the C.B.C. district court explained, ―[t]he success of one‘s fanta-
sy team over the course of the baseball season is dependent on one‘s cho-
sen players‘ actual performances on their respective actual teams.‖42  The 
players‘ names are used merely to identify the source of particular baseball 
statistics. 
Merely incidental or descriptive use of players‘ names to identify col-
lateral products is permissible unless it creates a likelihood of consumer 
confusion regarding endorsement or sponsorship.43  Observing that ―mere 
use of a name as a name is not tortious[,]‖44 the C.B.C. district court cor-
rectly held that ―CBC‘s mere use of Major League baseball players‘ names 
in conjunction with their playing records does not establish a violation of 
the players‘ right of publicity.‖45  The court found that C.B.C. was not us-
ing the players‘ names or identities to advertise its fantasy league games46 
and ―there is nothing about CBC‘s fantasy games which suggests that any 
Major League baseball player is associated with CBC‘s games or that any 
player endorses or sponsors the games in any way.‖47  Agreeing with the 
district court, the Eighth Circuit held, ―[n]or is there any danger here that 
consumers will be misled, because the fantasy baseball games depend on 
the inclusion of all players and thus cannot create a false impression that 
 
 40 See id. at 211–12. 
 41 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
818, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 42 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 
1077, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 43 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‘g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that artist may use 
―Tiger Woods‖ on painting‘s packaging and in narrative description of painting because doing so does 
not falsely suggest that the famous golfer sponsors or approves the painting).  See also Romantics v. 
Activision Publ‘g, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding that ―[d]efendants have 
made no trademark use of the name of ‗The Romantics,‘ using the name merely in the body of the 
Game to accurately identify the group that made the song famous,‖ and that there is no ―evidence that a 
substantial number of ordinarily prudent customers of the Game were deceived about whether The Ro-
mantics or Plaintiffs sponsored the Game.‖). 
 44 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1098. 
 47 Id. at 1086. 
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some particular player with ‗star power‘ is endorsing CBC‘s products.‖48 
Courts initially refused to characterize the names and identities of ce-
lebrities as protectable property rights.  For example, in Hanna Manufac-
turing Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,49 the Fifth Circuit held: ―Fame is 
not merchandise.  It would help neither sportsmanship nor business to 
uphold the sale of a famous name to the highest bidder as property.‖50  It 
concluded that an athlete has a valid claim for unauthorized commercial 
use of his name only if such usage falsely suggests that he uses or endorses 
the product. 
A common law right of publicity was first judicially recognized as a 
property right in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,51 
a 1953 case that arose out of litigation regarding the rights to use baseball 
players‘ images on trading cards.  Their names and photos were being used 
on trading cards without authorization to sell a variety of products, includ-
ing bubble gum, candy, soda, peanut butter, bread, ice cream, and des-
serts.52  In Haelan, the Second Circuit held that ―a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privi-
lege of publishing his picture[.]‖53  Thus, the court created a property right 
in the marketing and advertising value of one‘s identity, which, for exam-
ple, may be enforced to prohibit the unauthorized commercial use of a 
baseball player‘s name or likeness to advertise and sell products. 
Today, a narrow majority of states recognize the right of publicity.54  
As one scholar explained: 
Relief for the celebrity whose persona has been appropriated for a commercial 
endorsement is supported by the proposition that the celebrity, by dint of effort or 
luck, has created in his or her personality a marketable economic value distin-
guishable from the emotional value of identity.  The concept of value is intuitive-
ly satisfying.  Our society does recognize that certain people, whom we call cele-
brities, specifically affect the marketability of goods, services, and creative 
works.55 
Other scholars, however, are more skeptical and assert that publicity 
 
 48 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 
824 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 49 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935). 
 50 Id. at 766 (emphasis added). 
 51 202 F.2d 866 (2d. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); see generally J. Gordon Hyl-
ton, Baseball Cards and the Birth of the Right of Publicity: The Curious Case of Haelan  Laboratories 
v. Topps Chewing Gum, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 273 (2001). 
 52 See GeoCities.com, Chris Stufflestreet, A Somewhat Thorough History of Baseball Cards 
(1876–1980), http://www.geocities.com/chrisstufflestreet/history.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). 
 53 Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. 
 54 See John Grady, Steve McKelvey, & Annie Clement, A New “Twist” for “The Home Guys”?: 
An Analysis of the Right of Publicity Versus Parody, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT, 267, 271 (2005) (ob-
serving that twenty-eight states recognize the right of publicity). 
 55 Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value 
of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1239 (1986); see also Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic 
Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 103 (1994) (―The legal right of publicity can 
be understood as a fishing license designed to avoid races that would use up reputations too quickly.‖). 
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rights should not be recognized.  For example, Professor Madlow argues 
that ―a right of publicity . . . reflects . . . the triumph of a market-oriented, 
instrumentalist, individualistic understanding of fame over an older, more 
communitarian conception.‖56  He concludes that moral, economic, and 
consumer protection arguments made in support of recognizing publicity 
rights ―individually and cumulatively, are not nearly as compelling as is 
commonly supposed, nor as compelling as we have reason to demand.‖57 
In light of the conflicting policy concerns raised by this scholarly de-
bate—which may explain why Congress and more than twenty states have 
not created a property right in the commercial value of one‘s identity—the 
nature and scope of an individual‘s publicity rights should not be defined 
too broadly to the detriment of the public.  It is necessary to consider 
―whether the particular use of the persona evokes a broader concept that is 
properly a part of the public domain and therefore not within the right of 
publicity.‖58  This is a particularly important inquiry in the context of colla-
teral products such as fantasy league games, which incorporate the results 
of athletic performances and playing statistics therein and use players‘ 
names only to identify their source without creating any likelihood of con-
sumer confusion regarding approval or sponsorship. 
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.59 draws the proper line be-
tween unauthorized commercial use of an athlete‘s identity that violates the 
right of publicity, and fair use of an athlete‘s name for descriptive purposes 
that does not.  In this case a General Motors (―GM‖) television commercial 
was shown during the 1993 NCAA men‘s basketball tournament: 
A disembodied voice asks, ―How ‗bout some trivia?‖  This question is followed 
by the appearance of a screen bearing the printed words, ―You‘re Talking to the 
Champ.‖  The voice then asks, ―Who holds the record for being voted the most 
outstanding player of this tournament?‖  In the screen appear the printed words, 
―Lew Alcindor, UCLA, ‗67, ‗68, ‗69.‖  Next, the voice asks, ―Has any car made 
the ‗Consumer Digest‘s Best Buy‘ list more than once? [and responds:] The 
Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight has.‖  A seven-second film clip of the automobile, with 
its price, follows.  During the clip, the voice says, ―In fact, it‘s made that list 
three years in a row.  And now you can get this Eighty-Eight special edition for 
just $18,995.‖  At the end of the clip, a message appears in print on the screen: 
―A Definite First Round Pick,‖ accompanied by the voice saying, ―it‘s your 
money.‖  A final printed message appears: ―Demand Better, 88 by Oldsmo-
bile.‖60 
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, who changed his name from Lew Alcindor 
when he converted to the Islamic faith, alleged that this advertisement vi-
olated his right of publicity because he did not consent to the use of his 
 
 56 Madow, supra note 39, at 135. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Halpern, supra note 55, at 1255. 
 59 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 60 Id. at 409. 
MITTEN 11/10/2008 1:05 PM 
578 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:569 
former name therein.61  GM argued that ―its use of the name ‗Lew Alcin-
dor‘ was ‗incidental‘ and therefore not actionable‖62 because it merely de-
scribed his playing accomplishments.  ―While Lew Alcindor‘s basketball 
record may be said to be ‗newsworthy,‘‖63 the Ninth Circuit rejected this 
defense because it was used in an advertisement to sell GM‘s automobile.  
Regarding GM‘s analogous ―nominative fair use defense‖64 to Abdul-
Jabbar‘s Lanham Act false endorsement claim, which it also rejected, the 
court concluded: 
Had GMC limited itself to the ―trivia‖ portion of its ad, GMC could likely defend 
the reference to Lew Alcindor as a nominative fair use.  But by using Alcindor‘s 
record to make a claim for its car—like the basketball star, the Olds 88 won an 
―award‖ three years in a row, and like the star, the car is a ―champ‖ and a ―first 
round pick‖—GMC has arguably attempted to ―appropriate the cachet of one 
product for another,‖ if not also to ―capitalize on consumer confusion.‖65 
Like an unauthorized biography of a famous professional athlete, 
questions about his sports records in a Trivial Pursuit or Jeopardy game, or 
a board game incorporating his playing statistics, a fantasy sports league is 
based on facts in the public domain and uses his name only for descriptive 
purposes.  Prior to the Eighth Circuit‘s C.B.C. holding that the First 
Amendment protects the incorporation of players‘ statistics in fantasy 
baseball games, some courts incorrectly concluded that the unauthorized 
use of a professional athlete‘s name and playing statistics in a board game 
violated the right of publicity, while inconsistently acknowledging that 
such usage in a book would not do so.66  As one scholar explains: 
Right-of-publicity plaintiffs do not have a property interest in information about 
themselves.  The appropriation by a defendant of playing statistics and other 
facts in the public domain is very different from the appropriation of an individu-
al‘s name, likeness, or other attributes protected by the right of publicity.  Ba-
lanced against a publicity plaintiff‘s virtually nonexistent property interest in 
such information is society‘s substantial interest in public dissemination of in-
formation.  This societal interest is equally compelling regardless of the particu-
lar vehicle in which the information is disseminated.  Moreover, these situations 
lack the element of unjust enrichment because the users are not appropriating 
something to which they have no right.67 
 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 416. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 412.  This defense has three required elements: ―First, the product or service in question 
must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or 
marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must 
do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trade-
mark holder.‖  Id. 
 65 Id. at 413. 
 66 See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Palmer v. Schonhorn 
Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); see also Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban 
Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (unauthorized board game violated Howard Hughes‘ 
publicity rights). 
 67 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Lia-
bility Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 91 (1994).  Professor Kwall asserts that ―the use of athletes‘ play-
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On the other hand, another scholar asserts that the ―distinction be-
tween Trivial Pursuit and fantasy sports leagues lies in the extent of the 
commercial advantage obtained.‖68  Professor Karcher argues that ―the 
players are providing the content for the fantasy sports league industry 
which is a huge profit-making service industry, and the players should be 
compensated for the use of that content by fantasy league operators.‖69  He 
concludes that C.B.C. is unjustly enriched because it derives revenues from 
fantasy leagues based on results of their athletic performances and that 
players are entitled to royalties based on the fair market value of a license.70 
However, the commercial benefit that C.B.C. derives from its fantasy 
baseball league is irrelevant when public domain facts (i.e., baseball statis-
tics), which may be freely used by the public, are the essence of its game.71  
Extending the right of publicity to require C.B.C. to pay a licensing fee 
would create an exclusive property right that precludes, or severely limits, 
the commercial use of public domain information, reduces the availability 
of collateral products, and/or increases the costs to consumers.72  Such a 
broad state-created ―right of publicity on steroids‖ is legally and economi-
cally unjustified. 
 
ing statistics should be completely approved when they appear in either books or board games.‖  Id. at 
51. 
 68 Richard T. Karcher, The Use of Players’ Identities in Fantasy Sports Leagues: Developing 
Workable Standards for Right of Publicity Claims, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 557, 570 (2007). 
 69 Id. at 572. 
 70 Id. at 579.  He notes that there are some ―fantasy league operators currently paying a licensing 
fee in the range of two to three million dollars.‖  Id. 
 71 Detailed consideration of the complex fact-specific issue of how to appropriately balance the 
right of publicity with the First Amendment when the player‘s identity is the product itself or an integral 
part thereof, is outside the scope of this article.  Depending on the nature of the unauthorized use of a 
player‘s identity—in either a photo or drawing on products such as T-shirts, trading cards, or bobble 
heads, or in a video game—it may be artistic expression or parody protected by the First Amendment.  
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‘g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996); Romantics v. Activision Publ‘g, Inc., 532 
F. Supp. 2d 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 72 The C.B.C. district court suggested that ―CBC would be out of business if it were precluded 
from using in its fantasy games either players‘ names or their names in conjunction with their playing 
records.‖  C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d. 
1077, 1099 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
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